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Abstract We extend a recently developed generalized local polynomial estimator
into a semiparametric smooth coefficient framework to estimate a generalized cost
function. The advantage of the generalized local polynomial approach is that we can
simultaneously choose the degree of polynomial for each continuous nonparametric
regressor and the bandwidths via data-driven methods. We provide estimates of scope
economies from the joint production of microloans and microdeposits for a dataset of
Microfinance Institutions from over 50 countries. Our approach allows analysis on all
Microfinance Institutions rather than only those offering just microloans. Moreover,
the smooth coefficient estimator provides a general interface in which to account for
both direct and indirect environmental factors. We find substantial scope economies
in general, of about 10 % at the median, as well as evidence that economies of scope
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vary across the type of services and country in which the MFIs operate, suggesting
key insights into policy prescriptions.
Keywords Microfinance institutions · Efficiency · Scope economies ·
Semiparametric smooth coefficient · Generalized local polynomial · Cross-validation ·
Environmental variables
1 Introduction
Modern microfinance has been evolving away from its original focus on microcredit,
when Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) mainly extended tiny loans, typically without
collateral. Today, MFIs strive to offer a variety of loan products, as well as microsav-
ings accounts, microinsurance, and payment facilities. Empirical evidence suggests
the poor demand more than just microloans (Collins et al. 2009). From the supply
side, however, joint production of microloans and microdeposits must produce scope
economies to justify the costs of obtaining a license to collect microdeposits from the
poor. Moreover, cost advantages must be substantial to justify rewriting national laws
to permit MFIs to collect microsavings. This paper estimates the scope economies of
the joint production of microloans and microdeposits for a large, global sample of rated
MFIs with a semiparametric smooth coefficient model, which seamlessly incorporates
factors specific to microfinance.
Given that banks intermediate between surplus and deficit units, most of the empir-
ical literature on efficiency in commercial banking applies an intermediation approach
to estimate economies of scale and scope. In this approach, deposits are inputs in the
production of various types of loans and investments. However, unlike commercial
banks, MFIs remain focused on serving marginalized clientele and not on intermedi-
ation (Cull et al. 2011). The cost of delivering deposits to the poor in urban slums or
remote rural areas remain very high, and microdeposits are not the main input used to
produce loans (Garmaise and Natividad 2010). Thus, we use the alternative produc-
tion approach to microfinance cost efficiency because the production approach is better
suited to study the economies of scope in MFIs and has been used previously in the
banking literature. Previous research suggests that poor savers and borrowers may be
different groups and that scope economies arise from sharing physical infrastructure,
not sharing of information regarding microborrowers and savers to improve product
design (Hartarska et al. 2011). Therefore, we estimate a multiproduct cost function,
which can directly account for zero-valued inputs, following those used in earlier
bank efficiency studies—e.g., Berger and Humphrey (1991) and Mitchell and Onvural
(1996). In particular, we focus on scope economies between microloans and microsav-
ings, where these two outputs are measured in dollar volume but account for the cost
of capital as in Caudill et al. (2009).
To estimate our multiproduct cost function, we deploy recently developed semi-
parametric regression methods tailored for a smooth coefficient setup. This model
accommodates two important peculiarities of the microfinance industry. Specifically,
the method allows zero output values; thus, we include MFIs that do not take microde-
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posits.1 This is important because, unlike commercial banks which offer both savings
and loans, many MFIs only lend (Garmaise and Natividad 2010). In addition, while
some MFIs have private capital investment, most continue to use donor funds. Thus,
market-based control mechanisms are insufficient to ensure that the more efficient
MFIs—those offering both microloans and microdeposits—will survive. Therefore,
better estimates of scope economies for the industry should include both types of MFIs
in the sample to more accurately develop suitable policies regarding the operation of
MFIs.
We provide two separate econometric innovations for our semiparametric estima-
tion. First, we adapt the recently developed generalized local polynomial estimator of
the univariate nonparametric regression model of Hall and Racine (2013) to a multi-
variate semiparametric smooth coefficient setup. Hall and Racine (2013) propose using
a cross-validation procedure to select both the degree of polynomial (in the local poly-
nomial regression) and the bandwidth parameter. The advantages of this approach are
(i) the commonly used local constant or local linear regression models are nested as
a special case and can be selected via cross-validation if either estimator provides a
superior fit; (ii) if the true function is globally polynomial, the cross-validation pro-
cedure will return a set of bandwidths and polynomial order to reflect this fact; and
(iii) this generalized approach provides improvements in finite-sample efficiency and
rates of convergence.
Second, we deploy the recently proposed cross-validation procedure of Henderson
et al. (2012) for choosing the bandwidths based on our estimates of scope economies,
rather than the semiparametric cost function. Since our interest is on scope economies,
not the cost functions per se, it is not known whether bandwidths chosen to be optimal
for cost function estimation are also optimal for estimation of scope economies. It is
well known in applied nonparametric kernel estimation that careful selection of the
bandwidth is crucial for obtaining reliable estimates. Henderson et al. (2012) provide a
data-driven approach for selecting the smoothing parameter of an unobserved function,
rendering our estimates selected based on scope economies better suited for scope
estimation than bandwidths selected for cost estimation. Hence, we adapt this method
to the scope economies case.
Outside of these unique econometric issues related to studying economies of scope
across MFIs, perhaps most important is our ability to accommodate impact of the
external environment in which MFIs operate because it may have both direct and
indirect effect on cost and scope economies (Armedráriz and Szafarz 2010; Ahlin et
al. 2011). The semiparametric approach permits environmental factors to affect the
existence and the magnitudes of scope economies in a general fashion, both directly
and through their interaction with input prices. For example, costs of delivery of
microfinance services in remote areas are higher, so we control for the population
density in a country. On the macro level, we control for the level of financial system
development since MFIs in countries with higher bank penetration serve more marginal
clients (Cull et al. 2009). Due to the unique dataset we use, we can control for MFI-
1 Throughout the paper, we use microdeposits (microsavings) to mean voluntary microdeposits since
mandatory savings that MFIs require are a part of some of the lending technology associated with sol-
idarity groups and village banks.
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specific factors not possible with alternative datasets, namely the type of markets
served; e.g., primarily urban, primarily rural, and the type of microfinance lending
technology—village banking, solidarity groups, or individual lending. Unlike previous
studies of scope economies in microfinance, we are able to use three instead of two
input prices—the price of labor, and the prices of financial and physical capital, which
makes this study more in line with the banking literature. Finally, we further calculate
economies of scale using our semiparametric cost function and consider the joint
distribution of economies of scope and scale.
Our results indicate that, at the median, MFIs possess scope economies of 10 %.
However, we also find that roughly 25 % of the MFI-year observations have estimated
diseconomies of scope. Moreover, the environment in which MFIs operate both on a
macro and regional level affects their cost economies. In particular, we see the highest
potential economies of scope in Sub- Saharan Africa and South East Asia. Additionally,
we see that MFIs using village lending in rural areas have higher scope economies
than those using individual lending in urban areas. Overall, we find scope economies
in microfinance, but they do depend on the environment in which MFIs operate. When
considering the joint distribution of economies of scope and scale, we find that the
modal observation in our dataset has economies of scope, but diseconomies of scale.
Thus we are able to provide important insights into the debate on whether microsavings
should be promoted and what financial results we should expect from MFIs offering
microsavings. Since we find that not all MFIs can deliver microsavings in a sustainable
manner since there are scope diseconomies, if delivery of savings is important from
a policy perspective, it should not be expected to be financially sustainable in every
environment and for every MFI.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents relevant literature
and arguments for why the study of scope economies in microfinance is important.
Section 3 outlines the semiparametric setup deployed to estimate scope economies.
Section 4 details the generalized local polynomial estimator for a semiparametric
smooth coefficient model, and discusses bandwidth and polynomial order selection.
Our rated MFI data is discussed in Sect. 5. The results of our econometric study are
presented in Sect. 6. Conclusions and directions for future research are contained in
Sect. 7.
2 Summary of the relevant literature
While there is a well-developed literature on efficiency, scale, and economies of scope
for various financial institutions, most studies are for banks in developed countries
(Hughes and Mester 2009). Efficiency issues in financial institutions in developing
countries are much less understood (Berger et al. 2009). Furthermore, efficiency within
the MFIs is typically evaluated with various industry benchmarks (Balkenhol 2009,
reviews various ratios). For instance, Cull et al. (2007) study if there is a mission drift
with MFIs focusing on serving larger borrowers, while Cull et al. (2009) study how
various MFI characteristics impact their efficiency and outreach.
A structural approach, requiring cost (or profit) function estimation, is used by
Caudill et al. (2009) who study the evolution of MFIs in time, Hartarska and Mersland
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(2012) study the impact of governance mechanisms on managerial (in)efficiency, and
Hermes et al. (2011) study trade-offs between sustainability and outreach. Typically,
cost functions rather than profit functions are estimated because MFIs minimize costs,
and do not necessarily maximize profits. Moreover, cost functions are more appropriate
than profit functions because MFIs are price takers on the input market, and have
some monopoly on the output market for marginal clients (Varian 1984). Estimation
methods include data envelopment analysis (Paxton 2007; Gutierres-Nieto et al. 2007),
stochastic frontier analysis (Hartarska and Mersland 2012; Hermes et al. 2011), or
mixture modeling (Caudill et al. 2009).
Microfinance studies adapt the efficiency framework used to study financial insti-
tutions. There are two main structural approaches: production and intermediation,
described in detail in Humphrey (1985). For commercial bank data, the intermedia-
tion approach has produced better results, while the production approach has been less
popular since crucial, required variables such as the number of accounts are not easily
available (Freixas and Rochet 1997). In banking, Berger and Humphrey (1991) and
Mitchell and Onvural (1996) propose modifications to the approach by treating ‘pur-
chased funds’ as an input, by including interest expense for purchased funds in total
cost, and by measuring outputs by dollar amounts. More recently, a production-like
approach has been found more appropriate for other financial firms (van Cayseele and
Wuyts 2007).
In the microfinance literature, Hartarska et al. (2010, 2011) estimate scope
economies using a semiparametric generalization of the model of Berger and
Humphrey (1991). Hartarska et al. (2011) use MIX market data, which only has
two input prices—financial capital and operating expense per employees—but their
data do not allow controls for the type of market served: rural, urban, or a mixture of
the two. These are important differences among MFIs. In the present paper, we use a
more detailed and higher-quality dataset from external raters and follow more closely
banking studies in that we use three classical inputs in the cost function: average wage
per worker to measure price of labor, non-labor operating expense to net-fixed capital
ratio to measure the price of physical capital, and the cost of capital (Mitchell and
Onvural 1996). Following these banking studies, we also measure outputs in dollar
value. This is important because, in our dataset, the number of savers has not been
systematically collected by all rating agencies whose reports were used to assemble
the database. However, Hartarska et al. (2010) show that the average values of esti-
mated scope economies in MFIs do not differ if dollar values, rather than savings and
lending account numbers, are used as the output, even in a dataset with many outliers
such as the MIX market dataset.
Finally, this paper is a contribution to the literature on semiparametric methods
as nonparametric efficiency studies are few; even fewer are applications to financial
institution efficiency in developing countries (e.g., Ariff and Can 2008). Semipara-
metric methods are appropriate to study such institutions because of their flexibility
and ability to control for the impact of environmental variables, which is especially
important in a cross-country setting. The microfinance literature has revealed that the
external environment matters and that these factors must be accounted for in studies
of efficiency (Ahlin et al. 2011; Garmaise and Natividad 2010).
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3 Economies of scope, economies of scale, and cost estimation
3.1 Economies of scope
Economies of scope can emerge from two sources: (i) allocation of fixed costs over an
extended product mix, and (ii) cost complementarities across categories in production.
Allocating fixed costs over a firm’s product mix can contribute to scope economies
when excess capital capacity is reduced by providing both savings and loans rather than
individual provision of these services. Alternatively, cost complementarities result in
scope economies when consumer information developed in the production of either
savings or loans is used to reduce the monitoring requirements of the other product.
Given trustworthy estimates of scope economies, it is straightforward to assess the
production consequences of narrow services provided by microfinance institutions.
We describe here the general estimation of scope economies, followed by a detailed
discussion of a flexible, yet broad, methodology using semiparametric methods that
are robust to myriad functional form issues arising in empirical work.
Pulley and Humphrey (1993) define overall economies of scope as the percentage
of cost savings from producing all outputs jointly as opposed to producing each output
separately. Here, we have only two outputs, loans and deposits, so our estimates of
scope economies are:
SCOPEi = C(q1i , 0; ri ) + C(0, q2i ; ri ) − C(q1i , q2i ; ri )C(q1i , q2i ; ri ) , (1)
where i = 1, 2, . . . , n denotes the sample of size n, r is a vector of R input prices,
here taken to be the relative price of labor and borrowed funds, and C(·) is the cost
function. q1 and q2 are loans and deposits, respectively. Hence, given an estimate of
C(·), it is straightforward to construct an estimate of economies of scope.
An alternative measure of economies of scope provided by Pulley and Braunstein
(1992) is the quasi economies of scope measure; this measure does not restrict the
calculation of scope economies to the case of perfectly specialized output. That is,
the quasi economies of scope measure allows the researcher to calculate economies
of scope under the assumption that all firms produce some nonzero amount of each
potential output. Formally, quasi economies of scope is defined as
QSCOPEi = C[(1 − )q1i , q2i ; ri ] + C[q1i , (1 − )q2i ; ri ] − C[q1i , q2i ; ri ]C[q1i , q2i ; ri ] ,(2)
in which  is defined as the proportion of non-specialized outputs produced. That is, the
cost function C[(1−)q1i , q2i ; ri ] implies that firm i specializes primarily in q1, with
a (1−) share of total output being q1 and only an  share of total output consisting of
q2. Notice that, in the two output case, we consider, 0 <  < 12 , with  = 0 being the
perfectly specialized case defined by our primary measure of scope economies, and
 = 12 being the opposite extreme in which the firm is entirely non-specialized. The
difficulty in practice of deploying the quasi-scope measure is choosing the value of
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; Pulley and Braunstein (1992) consider a range of values for  and calculate scope
based on each different value in this range.
Our preferred measure of scope economies is the standard scope measure, given
in Eq. (1). For robustness, we consider the quasi-scope economies measure in Eq. (2)
setting  = 0.15. Results reported by Pulley and Braunstein (1992) show that setting
 close to zero returns estimates that are close to the standard scope estimates, and that
scope estimates generally decline as  increases (since the firm is less specialized with
larger values of ). From their results,  = 0.15 seems to provide a natural balance
between relaxing the perfect specialization restriction embedded in the standard scope
measure without assuming that the firms are already non-specialized to the extent that
there are no longer estimable cost reductions from choosing to specialize primarily in
a single output.
3.2 Economies of scale
An alternative measure of the difference between joint and specialized production
is economies of scale. Our main focus is on our estimates of economies of scope,
described in the previous section; however, we further explore economies of scale
in microfinance that stem from joint production of loans and savings, in addition to
important interactive effects between both economies of scope and scale. For instance,
do we find that microfinance institutions that exhibit economies of scope from joint
production of savings and loans also exhibit economies of scale?
We follow Pulley and Braunstein (1992) and define economies of scale in our
two-output setup as
SCALEi = C(q1i , q2i ; ri )
q1i ∂C(q1i ,q2i ;ri )∂q1i + q2i
∂C(q1i ,q2i ;ri )
∂q2i
. (3)
Note that estimates of scale that are greater than unity indicate scale economies,
while estimates of scale that are less than unity indicate diseconomies of scale.
This formulation of scale economies is different than the standard measure from
a cost function, (1 − Ecyi ), which is based on the sum of the output elasticities,
Ecyi = ∂ ln C(q1i ,q2i ;ri )∂ ln q1i +
∂ ln C(q1i ,q2i ;ri )
∂ ln q2i . This measure is not suitable here given the
large number of microfinance institutions that we have in our data that do not offer
deposits to their clientele. The formulation in (3) allows for zero output activities in
the construction of scale economies and is consistent with our specification of the cost
function.
3.3 Cost estimation
Given that the data used to estimate the cost function represent a mix of firms produc-
ing loans and deposits jointly and firms specializing in the production of loans exclu-
sively, the use of standard cost functions in production econometrics is not suitable.
Consider, for example, the transcendental logarithmic cost function (Christiansen et
al. 1971):
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ln Ci = α0 +
M∑
m=1
αm ln qmi + 0.5
M∑
m=1
M∑
η=1
αmη ln qmi ln qηi
+
M∑
m=1
R∑
l=1
δml ln qmi ln rli +
R∑
l=1
βl ln rli + 0.5
R∑
l=1
R∑
=1
βl ln rli ln ri . (4)
This setup cannot handle zero outputs. Given the appeal of this flexible functional
form in applied settings, such as the banking or financial services industries, various
authors have dealt with the zero output (or zero input price) problem in a variety
of ways. The simplest approach is to add a small number to all observations that
have a zero output value (Berger and Humphrey 1991) or to introduce a Box-Cox
transformation parameter to all outputs, i.e., instead of using ln qmi one would replace
it with qφmi = (qφmi − 1)/φ when φ is nonzero and is equal to the standard logarithmic
function when it is zero. This is problematic for several reasons. First, it abstracts from
the linear in parameters appeal of estimating a transcendental logarithmic function.
Second, if the estimate of φ is not statistically different from zero, then further recourse
is required. Lastly, all of the outputs are transformed by the same parameter. Thus,
the use of a translog cost function for the study of economies of scope is, in general,
restrictive, and inappropriate for a wide array of empirical problems.
An empirical cost function for estimating scope economies was suggested by Pulley
and Braunstein (1992), based on the theoretical cost function suggested by Baumol et
al. (1982). Their cost function is multiplicatively separable in outputs and input prices
and is quadratic (as opposed to log-quadratic) in outputs, thus alleviating the empirical
issue of zero-valued outputs in real-world datasets. More formally, the cost function
deemed appropriate for estimating economies of scope by Baumol et al. (1982) is
C(qi , ri ) = F(qi ) · G(ri ), (5)
where F(qi ) is a quadratic form in outputs, while G(ri ) is a linearly homogeneous
function of input prices. The empirical model suggested and estimated by Pulley and
Braunstein (1992) is
C(qi , ri ) = F(qi , ri ) · exp{G(ri )} + ui . (6)
The reason that both qi and ri appear in F(·) is that there is no explicit reason for
imposing separability between input prices and outputs. F(qi , ri ) is still required to
be quadratic in outputs. Pulley and Braunstein (1992) suggest that the exponential
of G(·) is required given that one is using costs and not logarithmic costs. However,
the theoretical suggestion of Baumol et al. (1982) only requires G(ri ) to be linearly
homogeneous. In our empirical analysis that follows, we have roughly 10 % of our
data with 0 input prices. Thus, the use of logarithmic input prices is not feasible. To
avoid making arbitrary transformations of the data, we follow the actual cost function
proposal of Baumol et al. (1982) and use input prices in levels when we estimate the
cost function.
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The composite cost model of Pulley and Braunstein (1992) can be written more
succinctly as
C(qi , ri ) = F(qi , ri ) · G˜(ri ) + ui . (7)
While taking the logarithm of both sides of Eq. 5 will produce an additively separable
model in F(·) and G(·), the generalized form of the Baumol et al. (1982) cost function
advocated initially by Pulley and Braunstein (1992) is sufficient to investigate costs
with the purpose of studying scope and scale economies.
The empirical form of the composite cost function advocated by Pulley and Braun-
stein (1992) is:
Ci =
⎡
⎣α0 +
M∑
m=1
αmqmi + 0.5
M∑
m=1
M∑
η=1
αmηqmi qηi +
M∑
m=1
R∑
l=1
δmlqmirli
⎤
⎦
× exp
(
β0 +
R∑
l=1
βlrli +
R∑
l=1
R∑
=1
βlrli ri
)
+ εi . (8)
A variation of this model involves taking the logarithm of both sides, which trans-
forms the cost function into a composite log-quadratic structure. The following sym-
metry conditions need to be imposed onto the above cost function: αmη = αηm
and βl = βl . To ensure homogeneity, the following conditions need to bind:∑
βl = 1; ∑l βl = 0 ∀;
∑
m δml = 0 ∀l. Equation (8) can be estimated
using standard maximum likelihood estimation routines assuming that the errors
are normally distributed, or using a general nonlinear least-squares algorithm if one
was unwilling to make a specific assumption on the distributive law of the error
terms.
3.4 The semiparametric smooth coefficient cost function
Pulley and Braunstein’s (1992) model reflects a composite structure suitable for
estimating scope economies, yet it is grounded in a parametric functional form,
which leaves concerns over functional form specification. Given the large num-
ber of covariates that we have access to, a fully nonparametric approach does not
seem reasonable. Thus, we use the recently proposed semiparametric smooth coef-
ficient cost function of Hartarska et al. (2011). This model takes a similar form
as that in Pulley and Braunstein (1992), but relaxes the functional form restric-
tions on G˜(ri ). With this style of cost function, the structure of Pulley and Braun-
stein’s (1992) model still remains, but the researcher is afforded sufficient flex-
ibility to model costs. We also mention here that another appealing feature of
this setup is that accounting for environmental variables (such as type of market
served by the MFI or load method) is straightforward and does not require a priori
specification.
123
M. S. Delgado et al.
For our purposes, we estimate the model of Hartarska et al. (2011). Let the function
G(ri ) ≡ exp(β0 + ∑βlrli + ∑∑βlrli ri ), then Eq. (8) can be rewritten as
C =
⎡
⎣α0 +
M∑
m=1
αmqmi + 0.5
M∑
m=1
M∑
η=1
αmηqmi qηi +
M∑
m=1
R∑
l=1
δmlqmirli
⎤
⎦ , (9)
where α0, αm , αmη and δml are the coefficients α0, αm , αmη and δml in Eq.
(8) multiplied by G(ri ). We can therefore specify α0, αm , αmη and δml as
functions of G(ri ) and a set of environmental variables, Vi . In our empiri-
cal setup, we include categorical indicators for region and time in V to flexi-
bly control for unobserved heterogeneity that often arises in panel data applica-
tions.
We can write Eq. (9) in the following semiparametric form:
Yi = Xiβ(Zi ) + εi (10)
where Yi ≡ Ci , Xi = [1, qi , qi q ′i , qir ′i ], Zi = [ri , Vi ]. We do not have to introduce
quadratic and interaction terms in Zi since the semiparametric estimator will select the
appropriate higher order/interaction terms. Here, qi q ′i is the m2 × 1 vector of squares
and interactions of the outputs and qir ′i is the ml × 1 vector of interactions between
outputs and input prices.
Another way to think of this model is that for a given level of Zi , we have a linear
in parameters model where the slopes possibly differ for differing levels of Zi . Since
Zi and Xi can contain the same variables, this model is more general than that of
Pulley and Braunstein (1992). One can also view the Pulley and Braunstein (1992)
model as a smooth coefficient model, with exp
(
β0 + ∑βlrli + ∑∑βlrli ri
)
rep-
resenting the smooth coefficient on qmi in Eq. (6). The key difference between the
semiparametric smooth coefficient model in Eq. (10) and the parametric smooth coef-
ficient model in Eq. (6) is that the coefficients are identical, up to scale, in Eq. (6)
while in Eq. (10) they can be entirely different functions altogether. At this point, it
is important to emphasize that imposing linear homogeneity is difficult in our semi-
parametric setup given that we are not imposing any structure on β(Zi ).2 However,
this is a small price to pay since even the use of the popular translog specifica-
tion, which violates global concavity, is traditionally used in production economet-
rics.
The semiparametric smooth coefficient model can be specified as quadratic in out-
put, as recommended by Baumol et al. (1982), but is more general in the input price
structure, due to the lack of specification on β(Zi ).
2 See Du et al. (2013) for an approach to impose linear homogeneity in this setting.
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4 Generalized local polynomial estimation for SPSCM
4.1 Estimation
We rewrite model (8) in the form
Yi =
L∑
=0
β(Zi )Xi + εi ,  = 0, 1, . . . , L (11)
in which  indexes the number of regressors. Recall that Y is a scalar outcome, and
rewrite X as X ≡ (X0, X1, . . . , X L) is a (L +1)-dimensioned vector in which X0 ≡ 1
and X =0 are the L regressors. Assume that Zi is vector valued of dimension S. Using
the local polynomial approach, we can approximate each coefficient at a point z ∈ Z
via
β(z) ≈ a +
S∑
s=1
ps∑
j=0
b( j)s (Zsi − zs) j (12)
for polynomial order ps for each s element in Z . The notation b( j)s denotes the j th
derivative of coefficient function  with respect to component s. Notice that in this
formulation, while we allow for an arbitrary order of polynomial for each different
component in Z , we restrict the polynomial interactions across s to be zero. Then, we
are interested in the solution to the weighted least-squares problem
1
nh
n∑
i=1
⎡
⎣Yi −
L∑
=0
a Xi −
L∑
=0
S∑
s=1
ps∑
j=0
b( j)s (Zsi − zs) j Xi
⎤
⎦
2
K
(
Zi − z
h
)
(13)
in which K(·) is a product kernel function and h is a bandwidth vector. In this setup,
a is our estimate of the th coefficient function at a point z ∈ Z , and b( j)s denotes the
partial derivative of order j for coefficient k with respect to component s.3
3 Note that this generalized formulation nests the familiar local constant least squares problem when
ps = 0, ∀s
1
nh
n∑
i=1
⎡
⎣Yi −
L∑
=0
a Xi
⎤
⎦
2
K
(
Zi − z
h
)
or the local linear least-squares problem when ps = 1, ∀s
1
nh
n∑
i=1
⎡
⎣Yi −
L∑
=0
a Xi −
L∑
=0
S∑
s=1
bs (Zsi − zs )Xi
⎤
⎦
2
K
(
Zi − z
h
)
.
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Let Z˜si ≡
(
(Zsi − zs)1, (Zsi − zs)2, . . . , (Zsi − zs)ps
)
and then define Z˜i ≡
(
Z˜1i , Z˜2i , . . . , Z˜ Si
)
. Then, for X˜i ≡
(
Xi
Z˜i ⊗ Xi
)′
, we seek the (L + 1) × (∑ ps + 1)
estimator δ̂ given by
δ̂ = (X˜ ′K(z)X˜)−1 X˜ ′K(z)Y (14)
Note that our estimates of the functions β(z) are recovered by β̂(z) = e1δ̂ for e1
being a (L + 1)× (∑ ps + 1)-dimensioned vector with the first L + 1 elements being
unity and the remaining (L + 1) × ∑ ps elements being zero.
To make our estimator operational in a mixed data setting, we follow Racine and
Li (2004) and deploy the generalized product kernel function for K(·).
K(·) =
Sc∏
c=1
kc
(
Zci − zc
hc
) Su∏
u=1
ku(Zui − zu; hu)
So∏
o=1
ko(Zoi − zo; ho) (15)
in which
kc
(
Zci − zc
hc
)
= 1√
2π
exp
[
1
2
(
Zci − zc
hc
)2]
(16)
is a univariate Gaussian kernel function used for each of the Sc continuous variables
in Zi ,
ku(Zui − zu; hu) =
{
1 if Zui − zu = 0
hu if Zui − zu = 0 (17)
is a univariate discrete kernel function used for each of the Su unordered discrete
variables in Zi , and
ko(Zoi − zo; ho) =
{
1 if Zoi − zo = 0
h|Z
o
i −zo|
o if Zoi − zo = 0
(18)
is a univariate discrete kernel function used for each of the So ordered discrete variables
in Zi (Li and Racine 2007). In the above product kernel setup, hc is a Sc-dimensioned
vector of bandwidths for the continuous variables and hu and ho are Su- and So-
dimensioned vectors of unordered and ordered discrete variable bandwidths.
4.2 Automatic selection of bandwidths and polynomial order
Following Hall and Racine (2013), we propose to automatically select both the band-
widths, h, and polynomial order, ps , via cross-validation. They show that simulta-
neous data-driven selection of both the bandwidth and degree of polynomial yields
improvements in finite-sample efficiency and rates of convergence of the nonpara-
metric estimator. In the case that the true underlying data generating process is a
polynomial, the cross-validation procedure will select the appropriate order of poly-
nomial and achieve the parametric
√
n rate of convergence. We adapt their method into
a multivariate smooth coefficient setting, and consider both continuous and discrete
variables.
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In our case, however, we are interested primarily in scope economies—scope
economies is a function that we must construct based on cost estimates and there-
fore is not directly observed. Consequently, the general cross-validation approach to
selecting bandwidths (i.e., minimizing the mean-squared error between the observed
outcome and conditional mean) is not applicable. Of course, one might choose band-
widths based on cross-validation over the cost function model, but it is not clear that
the bandwidth that is optimal for cost function estimation is optimal for economies of
scope estimation.
Recently, Henderson et al. (2012) have proposed a way to use cross-validation to
select the optimal smoothing parameter for function estimation when the function is not
observable. Specifically, they propose the following approach (adapted to our context
of scope). Denote scope in (1) via S, noting that scope is a function of cost. Then, we
seek the bandwidth and polynomial pair that minimizes the integrated squared error
given by
ISE(h, p) =
∫ [
Ŝ(Ci ) − S(Ci )
]2 dC
=
∫
Ŝ(Ci )2dC − 2
∫
Ŝ(Ci )S(Ci )dC +
∫
S(Ci )2dC. (19)
Since the last term does not depend on (h, p), minimizing ISE is equivalent to choos-
ing (h, p) to minimize the first two terms. However, since S(Ci ) is not observed in the
second term, Henderson et al. (2012) propose replacing it with its leave-one-out esti-
mator: Ŝ(C−i ). Therefore, we arrive at our cross-validation function by minimizing
the sample analog
min
h,p
n∑
i=1
Ŝ(Ci )2 − 2Ŝ(Ci )Ŝ(C−i ). (20)
Note that we construct Ŝ(C−i ) from a leave-one-out estimator of Ci . It is clear that
using the generalized local polynomial approach of Hall and Racine (2013), combined
with the bandwidth selection approach of Henderson et al. (2012), constitutes an
econometric approach that is both general with respect to the nonparametric local
polynomial estimator, and robust by selecting the optimal bandwidth for estimating
economies of scope.4
One important issue for implementing the generalized local polynomial procedure
is the complication that the set (h, p) contains different numerical restrictions that
must hold during optimization of the cross-validation procedure. That is, h contains
both continuous and discrete regressors and must be bounded between [0,∞) for
the continuous components, yet [0, 1] for the discrete components. Yet, within these
bounds, the bandwidths are allowed to vary continuously. p, on the other hand, must
be defined over the set of natural numbers. Hence, these restrictions impose substan-
tial demands on the nonlinear optimization algorithm. Hence, we follow Hall and
4 We also explore the robustness of our primary results by selecting bandwidths that are optimal for
estimation of economies of scale. We find that, in general, our empirical results are qualitatively consistent
when we smooth over scale.
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Racine (2013) and use the Nonsmooth Optimization by Mesh Adaptive Direct Search
(NOMAD) optimizer developed by Abramson et al. (2011), and available in the crs
package (Nie and Racine 2012) in R.
5 Data
The data used are collected from the rating reports of MFIs and includes publicly avail-
able data from www.ratingfund2.org, as well as data collected with special permission
from private rating reports. In the early 2000s, microfinance rating was believed to be
a market-based mechanism of control that would discipline managers by providing
independent reporting for potential donors and investors. Many MFIs submitted to this
independent evaluation and opened their books, signaling that they were more trans-
parent than the average MFI. The rating fund offered financial support and required
that the rating reports remain publicly available online.
The dataset used here contains rating reports completed by June 2007. The data
comprise an unbalanced panel from 1999 to 2006 for 244 MFIs operating in 53 coun-
tries with about 3 years of data per MFI for a total of 777 observations.5 The two outputs
used—loans and savings—are measured as the dollar value of loans outstanding and
the dollar value of voluntary deposits, respectively. Unlike previous microfinance stud-
ies, these data allow us to use more precise input prices in-line with the main banking
literature. In particular, it allows us to separate the price of labor from that of fixed
capital. The input price of labor is the average annual salary per employee, the cost
of capital is the weighted cost of borrowed funds (deposits and loans), and the input
price of physical capital is the ratio of non-labor operating expenses to the value of
net-fixed assets. Total costs are the sum of input prices and input quantities.
Summary statistics of the variables used in the scope estimation are in Table 1.6 Of
our rated MFI observations, 76 % only extend loans while the remaining 24 % offer
both loans and mobilize savings, confirming that most MFIs still offer only credit.
MFIs in the largest to date MFI dataset maintained by mixmarket show the same
distribution of lending-only and lending and deposit institutions. The average MFI
has about $4.1 million in loan portfolio outstanding, with a range from slightly more
than $3,500 to $34.6 million. The volume of savings (when offered) is $914,669 on
average and the largest case is about $24 million. The average value of annual salaries
is $5,516, the cost of capital (deposits and borrowed funds) is 8 %, and the ratio of non-
labor operating expense to net-fixed assets is 4.2. The average value of the population
density in the country in which the MFIs operate is 71 people per square kilometer, and
it varies from sparsely populated countries with 2 to very densely populated countries
with 1,050 people per square kilometer. Financial depth is the ratio of money aggregate
including currency, deposits and electronic currency (M3) over GDP and measures
the level of financial development. It is 0.39 on average varying from 0.07 to 1.39.
We see that 34 % of our MFIs serve urban markets only and an additional 38 % serve
5 For a detailed comparison of this with other available datasets see Mersland (2009).
6 Distribution of MFIs by country is presented in the “Appendix”. Comparison with other publicly available
data shows that these data have more observations from Latin America.
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Table 1 Summary statistics of variables used in estimation
Variable Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Loans ($) 4,071,677 5,111,683 3,586 34,604,000
Savings ($) 914,669 3,060,310 0 23,954,000
Total cost 1,086,463 1,288,910 2,689 12,197,321
Average wage ($) 5,515.85 4,054.15 18.07 26,572.67
Cost of capital (ratio) 4.22 29.04 0.04 800.00
Cost of funds (%) 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.93
Population density 71.13 86.79 2 1,050
Financial depth 0.39 0.20 0.07 1.39
Market served
Urban 0.34 – 0 1
Rural 0.14 – 0 1
Urban and rural 0.38 – 0 1
No information 0.14 – 0 1
Loan methods
Village banks 0.16 – 0 1
Solidarity groups 0.21 – 0 1
Individual 0.58 – 0 1
Other 0.01 – 0 1
Unclassified 0.04 – 0 1
both urban and rural markets. Service mainly to rural markets is rare for the group
of rated MFIs that compose our dataset. Additionally, we see that 58 % of our rated
MFIs provide loans on an individual basis while another 21 % use solidarity groups
to provide loan services.
The wide range in cost of capital is natural in an industry with lots of subsidized
debt where some MFIs receive an abundance of subsidized debt while other MFIs
do not. For example, Mersland et al. (2013) studied differences between Christian
founded MFIs and secular MFIs and determined that the Christian MFIs had greater
access to international networks which resulted in significantly lower funding costs. In
particular, since the microfinance industry is international, but the level of internation-
alization varies substantially, differences in access to funding sources result in wider
ranges of funding costs (Mersland et al. 2011). Another reason for the wide range in
funding cost is that some countries have very generous and cheap public funding for
MFIs. Moreover, some MFIs are allowed to mobilize savings, and interest paid on
savings can differ substantially. Furthermore, some MFIs take mandatory savings on
which they normally pay no interest. Taken together, the funding environment differs
considerably resulting in the wide range in cost of capital for MFIs which appears in
our data.7
7 Differences in funding costs may also stem from differences in inflation across countries and different
risk premiums. Inflation is, however, to a large extent taken care of in the dataset since all amounts are
converted into US dollars.
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It is the presence of MFIs with 0 savings that require us to eschew a traditional cost
function approach to estimating scope economies and, in addition, the fact that some
MFIs have zero input costs for funding implies that we must include input prices into
our semiparametric smooth coefficient cost function in level form as well. The added
generality afforded by our approach is key for analyzing these types of datasets as ad
hoc approaches to dealing with zeros are unappealing in applied settings. Further, using
level input prices as opposed to logarithmic prices is consistent with the theoretical
cost function of Baumol et al. (1982).
Lastly, a natural concern one may have with our empirical results is that lending-
only MFIs may self-select and this will drive the results on scope economies we
detail here. We assume that there is no endogenous process of selection into deposit
collecting for lending-only MFIs. MFIs vary by size so even institutions capable of
collecting deposits may operate as lending-only if the local laws do not permit deposit
collection by (small) MFIs. Many countries have adopted MFI-specific regulations
allowing variations in lending and savings (so it is not necessarily the underlying
cost structure that determines if an MFI collects deposits). For example, for a large
cross-country sample, Hartarska et al. (2013) report that 63 % of the deposit-taking
MFIs and 14 % of the lending-only MFIs were subject to central banking regulation.
Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) allow for regulatory status to be correlated with MFI-
specific characteristics and estimate a Hausmann-Taylor model of MFI performance
but do not find a difference in outreach and sustainability by regulatory status. In
a consequent article, Cull et al. (2011) observe that MFIs in the same country face
different enforcement, and find that the stringency of the country prudential regulations
(onsite visits and their frequency) do not affect financial results but affect the depth of
outreach (poverty level of clients). Numerous other studies have found that regulation
(presumably of mainly deposit-taking institutions) does not affect performance, and
previous studies on the presence of scope economies for MFIs have assumed that
there is no endogenous selection into deposit-taking MFIs (Mersland and Strøm 2009;
Hartarska et al. 2010, 2011, 2013).
6 Results
For the model discussed in the previous section, we estimate both a parametric cost
setup using nonlinear least squares following Pulley and Braunstein (1992) and a semi-
parametric smooth coefficient cost function with two outputs and two input prices.8
Input prices are scaled by the price of physical capital (price of capital ratio) to pro-
duce two relative input prices to be used in each piece of the cost function: labor costs
and financial costs. Total costs and loans and deposits are scaled by 1,000,000 and
10,000,000, respectively. All results were computed using R (R Development Core
Team 2008). Bandwidths and polynomial order for the semiparametric model were
selected simultaneously via cross-validation over scope, discussed previously, using
8 Since the cost function is homothetic in input prices, we can always normalize by one of the input prices.
Thus, while we have three inputs, only two of them enter into our analysis.
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Table 2 Scope economy measures summarized at the quartiles
Overall scope Diseconomies Economies
Q1 0.0342 (0.0447) −0.0046 (0.0154) 0.0430 (0.1184)
Q2 0.1476 (0.2203) −0.0030 (0.0148) 0.1568 (2.1859)
Q3 0.4253 (0.4294) −0.0017 (0.1145) 0.4353 (1.0951)
Standard errors for each estimate are given below in parentheses. Estimates obtained via nonlinear least
squares estimation of the parametric cost function
5 multistarts.9 In addition to normalized input prices entering the unknown smooth
coefficients, we also included the year in which the MFI was observed and its region
(see “Appendix” for country and region classifications), as well as the main type of
lending methodology the MFI uses (village bank, solidarity group, individual loan),
the main market the MFI services (urban, rural or both), the population density of the
area in which the MFI operates, and the level of financial depth of the country. Given
our ability to smooth discrete variables, year, loan methodology and main market
served were all smoothed using discrete kernels (see Li and Racine 2007).
6.1 Parametric cost function
As a first cut, we estimate the parametric cost function proposed by Pulley and Braun-
stein (1992) using nonlinear least squares. Our estimates of scope economies are
reported in Table 2 at the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles for overall scope economies,
scope economies, and scope diseconomies. Our estimates are not statistically sig-
nificant, but are qualitatively consistent with our expectations. For overall scope
economies, the median estimate indicates that there is a 15 % reduction in costs from
offering both loans and savings. We conjecture that one reason for the lack of statistical
significance of our parametric estimates may be due to model misspecification, and
turn next to our preferred semiparametric models.
6.2 Bandwidths and polynomial order
Before discussing our estimates of scope economies and their implications, we first
discuss the bandwidths obtained via our cross-validation selection procedure since
bandwidth and polynomial order selection is important for semiparametric estimation
and forms the heart of generalized local polynomial regression estimation. Table 3
presents our cross-validated bandwidths and polynomial order for the regression model
that includes and excludes our additional environmental variables (population density,
financial depth, area, and lending method). Further, as discussed at length in Li and
Racine (2007), cross-validated bandwidths have an important interpretation of their
9 Multistarts are the number of different trials used to calculated the minimum of the least-squares cross-
validation function. Given the nonlinearity of this function with respect to multiple bandwidths, it is good
practice to use numerous multistarts to avoid obtaining bandwidths indicative of a local minimum as opposed
to the global minimum.
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Table 3 Bandwidths and degree of polynomial for our semiparametric estimates
Variable Including controls Excluding controls Cutoff
Bandwidth Polynomial Bandwidth Polynomial
WL 0.5194 3 1.0824 2 3.0750
WF 0.9048 4 0.2863 3 5.3450
Pop. dens. 0.1743 3 – – 2.4405
Fin. depth 0.6680 1 – – 1.0221
Year 0.1683 – 0.3182 – 1.0000
Region 0.9422 – 0.5218 – 1.0000
Area 0.5940 – – – 1.0000
Method 0.3841 – – – 1.0000
Bandwidths and polynomial are selected via GLP LSCV as in (20)
own in an applied setting. In the local constant regression setting—i.e., when the
order of polynomial is zero—bandwidths that are ‘close’ to their upper bounds are
smoothed out of the regression model, meaning that they are irrelevant in terms of
predicting the response variable. In the local polynomial context, bandwidths that are
‘close’ to their upper bounds enter the regression function globally of the same order
of polynomial. For example, in a local linear setting (polynomial order 1), a variable
with a bandwidth ‘close’ to its upper bound enters the regression globally linearly.
For continuous variables, Li and Racine (2007) suggest that 2 standard deviations
of the variable is an effective upper bound, while for discrete variables, the effective
upper bound is unity. (Note that for discrete variables, the local constant interpretation
of relevance/irrelevance always holds, regardless of the degree of local polynomial,
because the local polynomial order is only with respect to continuous variables.)
For ease of reference, we have included our cutoffs for each variable in Table 3:
twice the standard deviation for each continuous variable, and unity for each discrete
variable. At first glance, two points are apparent. First, none of the bandwidths on
our variables have reached their upper bounds. This insight tells us that all of the
variables in our regression are relevant and/or local predictors of scope economies
(recall that we select bandwidths over scope economies directly and not cost). This is
particularly important for understanding the implied model specification selected by
cross-validation. Omission of any of the variables in our set of controls likely leads
to an omitted variables bias because our automatic cross-validation approach has
demonstrated that each variable is important for prediction of scope economies. This
is consistent with recent theoretical criticisms by Armedráriz and Szafarz (2010) who
argue that environmental factors are important to account for in cross-country studies,
and in contrast to Beck et al. (2008) who argue that variables utilized to measure
financial sector development and financial depth, in particular, have low correlation
with outreach in cross-country studies of banks. Moreover, any global specification that
one might wish to impose (e.g., a standard linear, parametric cost structure) is likely
to be misspecified because our cross-validation procedure has identified significant
local nonlinearities and has assigned relatively ‘small’ bandwidths accordingly.
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Table 4 Scope economy measures summarized at the quartiles
Overall Scope Diseconomies Economies
Controls No controls Controls No controls Controls No controls
Q1 −0.0257 0.0000 −0.3584 −0.3680 0.0795 0.0780
(0.0104) (0.0000) (0.0949) (0.1975) (0.0211) (0.0621)
Q2 0.0961 0.1040 −0.1300 −0.1534 0.2215 0.1848
(0.0007) (0.0450) (0.0131) (0.0954) (0.0599) (0.0570)
Q3 0.3523 0.3243 −0.0497 −0.0496 0.4847 0.4127
(10.3081) (0.0769) (0.0434) (0.0000) (0.0593) (0.0879)
Standard errors for each estimate are given below in parentheses. Statistically significant scope estimates at
the 5 % level are highlighted in bold. Estimates obtained via (1) with the SPSCM model described in (10).
Bandwidths are those displayed in Table 3
Second, except for financial depth in our model with full controls, the orders of
polynomial on the continuous variables are greater than one. This second insight tells
us that the commonly imposed orders of local polynomial in standard nonparametric
local polynomial kernel regression—local constant (order 0) and local linear (order
1)—do not provide the best fit for scope economies estimation in the context of this
data. Indeed, Hall and Racine (2013) have shown that the generalized local polynomial
procedure may obtain a faster rate of convergence and higher degree of efficiency,
compared to both local constant and local linear nonparametric regression estimators.
Our cross-validation procedure suggests that these standard nonparametric models
may not be efficient. We mention here that the work of Hartarska et al. (2011) uses
only a local constant estimator.
Finally, we point out that the bandwidth on region is substantially larger in our setup
with additional controls than in our setup with limited controls (0.9422 and 0.5218).
We cautiously interpret a bandwidth of 0.94 for a discrete variable to indicate that this
variable has limited relevance (it is not quite at its upper bound). This indicates that
in our limited controls setup, our estimates rely more on the generality of a regional
indicator to absorb much of the variation in scope economies that is not explained by
other controls. Our inclusion of additional control variables accounts for this variation,
decreasing our reliance on our regional indicator.
6.3 Scope economies
Our estimates of scope economies and their standard errors are summarized in Table 4,
also at the 25th, 50th (median) and 75th percentiles. We find scope economies in
microfinance institutions indicating substantial cost savings from mobilizing deposits
and extending loans instead of only extending loans (assuming of course that the
same cost structure of the MFIs are preserved). The results suggest that MFIs achieve
substantial reductions in costs by offering both savings and loans to their customer
base.
Looking at the median estimates of scope economies, we see that regardless of
whether environmental factors are included, there is a 10 % reduction in costs from
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offering both loans and savings. We find that there is not much difference in scope
estimates at the quartiles across both controls and limited controls specifications. We
find that inclusion of our controls leads to a negative estimate of scope at the lower
quartile, and a slightly higher estimate at the upper quartile. We find that in both
models, scope economies are generally statistically significant at a 5 % confidence
level. Furthermore, it is apparent that our estimates of scope are more heterogeneous
in the model with full set of controls. These results indicate that there is heterogeneity
induced by our additional set of control variables.
Focusing on scope diseconomies, we see that the MFIs with estimated scope dis-
economies have slightly lower levels of diseconomies when we account for our envi-
ronmental controls. The median estimated scope diseconomies is −0.13, while the
median scope diseconomies for our model without controls is −0.15. The interquartile
range is slightly smaller. In general, however, these differences across set of controls
are not large enough to statistically distinguish between scope diseconomies in each
model. Notice that for our diseconomies estimates, we do not find as much statisti-
cal significance in the model excluding our additional controls as in the full controls
specification.10
Considering only those MFIs with scope economies, we see that our summary mea-
sures are higher in the model with controls than our model without controls. Further,
we find significance at each reported quartile, while our estimates without full controls
are only significant at the 50th and 75th percentiles. The statistical significance, as well
as relatively larger magnitude of scope economies estimates in the full controls model
suggest that our control variables have a strong influence on the scope economies of
MFIs; such heterogeneity we explore in the following subsections.
We now turn to statistical significance of our scope estimates, presented concisely
in Fig. 1. To show statistical significance of observation-specific estimates in nonlinear
regression models, Henderson et al. (2012) propose using 45◦ gradient plots to simul-
taneously show the sign, significance, and distribution of estimates. We construct these
plots by placing the estimates of scope economies on the 45◦ line, and then overlaying
a 95 % bootstrap confidence interval above and below each estimate. Since our esti-
mates and standard errors are observation-specific, we have an observation-specific
confidence interval. Then, if for any observation, the horizontal line at zero lies outside
of the confidence interval that estimate is statistically significant.
We see that most of our estimates for both specifications are positive and significant,
suggesting that in general MFIs realize positive and significant reductions in cost from
offering both loans and savings. We further see that the distribution of scope estimates
10 We note that with the use of flexible estimation methods that theoretical consistency may be sacrificed.
In our case, this entails the estimated cost function satisfying given axioms of producer theory, notably
monotonicity of the cost function in both outputs, loans and deposits. The percentage of observations where
our estimated cost function is non-monotonic for loans is 6.7 % when we include controls and roughly 3 %
with no controls. However, for deposits, across both models roughly 50 % of the estimated cost function
derivatives are negative. What drives this behavior is a single, smooth coefficient term which dominates the
expression—the interaction between loans and deposits. The coefficient on this term is largely negative, and
when multiplied by the amount of loans in the derivative of cost w.r.t. deposits, we have a largely negative
term. This matters because many other terms in this derivative are zero, since deposits is mostly zero for
almost 75 % of the observations. While this is certainly an important issue to explore, we leave it for future
research to combine the approach detailed here with constrained nonparametric methods.
123
Should all microfinance institutions mobilize microsavings?
(a)
(b)
Fig. 1 Statistical significance of scope economies. a 45◦ gradient plots for scope economies with controls,
b 45◦ gradient plots for scope economies with no controls
varies substantially, with a substantial portion of our estimates exceeding 0.5. The
distribution of diseconomies is relatively sparse over the range (−1, 0), and it is also
clear that there is a group of observations with small scope estimates that are not
statistically significant. We find statistical significance of scope economies in both
sets of estimates, however, as indicated by our quartile summaries of scope estimates,
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Table 5 Summary of scope economies by output structure at each quartile
Including controls Excluding controls
Loans Savings and loans Loans Savings and loans
Q1 −0.0270 −0.0246 0.0000 −0.0037
(0.0007) (0.0045) (0.0000) (0.0501)
Q2 0.0881 0.1353 0.0929 0.1800
(0.0003) (0.0301) (0.1438) (0.1073)
Q3 0.3166 0.4744 0.2611 0.5332
(0.0275) (0.1350) (0.1856) (0.4209)
Standard errors given below each estimate. Statistically significant estimates at the 5 % level are highlighted
in bold
we find a larger share of estimates are significant in the specification with full controls.
Specifically, we find that 65 % of our scope estimates are statistically significant in
the full controls specification, whereas only 45 % are significant in the model without
additional controls. We point out that regardless of our set of controls, both sets of
controls allow for general unknown forms of heterogeneity in the scope estimates.11
Hence, our results are consistent with the cautionary tone expressed in the theoretical
paper of Armedráriz and Szafarz (2010) and the empirical work of Ahlin et al. (2011)
showing that cross-country studies should account for the environment in which they
operate.
6.4 Scope economies across output structure
In Table 5, scope economies in MFIs which actually provide loans and savings facilities
are compared with those in MFIs which only lend. We find that regardless of which set
of control variables we use, MFIs that offer both savings and loans have substantially
higher scope economies than MFIs that only offer loans. It is important to point out
that, at the quartiles, we do not find any statistical significance of our scope estimates
in the model without controls, but we do find statistical significance for each of our
estimates in the model with full controls. These results are intuitive and indicate
that these additional variables are important factors in the cost function of different
MFIs—omission of which will lead to an omitted variables bias in our estimates of
scope economies.
Given the magnitudes of our bandwidths when we include control variables in
our smooth coefficients of our cost function, statistical significance, and the visual
evidence provided by the distributional plots, we choose to more carefully analyze
11 We also considered augmented variants of the 45◦ plots presented in Fig. 1 that differentiate between
institutions in our sample that offer only loans and those that jointly offer savings and loans, to assess
whether there are large distributional differences between scope estimates across these groups. We omit
these plots since we were not able to identify distinct differences across the scope estimate distributions
across these two groups. Note that this merely indicates that the heterogeneity we identify in our estimates
of scope economies affects scope economies across these two groups similarly.
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Table 6 Scope economy measures across regions, summarized at the quartiles
ECA LA SSA SEA MENA
Q1 −0.0325 −0.0592 0.0519 0.0615 −0.0287
(0.0007) (0.0238) (0.0764) (0.0076) (0.0078)
Q2 0.0795 0.0772 0.2409 0.2958 0.0315
(0.0211) (0.0524) (0.0516) (0.0609) (0.0052)
Q3 0.2648 0.3056 0.7005 0.6333 0.2334
(0.0305) (0.0402) (0.0111) (0.0270) (0.0539)
Standard errors for each estimate are below in parentheses; statistical significance at the 5 % level are
highlighted in bold
scope economies estimated via inclusion of these variables directly into the smooth
coefficients. All three of our key discrete variables—region, area and lending method—
are not smoothed out of our model and therefore suggest an impact on the smooth
coefficients of our cost function and consequently our estimates of scope economies.
6.5 Scope economies across control variables
Given the fact that nonparametric models deliver estimates which are observation-
specific, an intuitive way to present results is to condition on specific levels of the
variables of interest. To that end, we present our estimates of scope economies here
by focusing on how they vary across three of our most important controls, the region
the MFI is located, the area in which the MFI provides services, and the type of loan
structure the MFI uses.
Scope economies are larger in countries with higher population density. For exam-
ple, countries with scope diseconomies have average population densities of 47 persons
per square km, while it is 81 persons per square km in countries with scope economies.
This result seems to suggest that MFI’s working in less densely populated countries
will have (or experience) diseconomies of scope. Here, MFIs may not have a con-
sumer base large enough to provide savings accounts as well as lending opportunities.
Recall, the presence of scope economies is such that cost sharing is available to the
MFI via a product mix. In this case, it could turn out that MFIs in rural areas are not
able to experience these cost-sharing opportunities the way that MFIs in more urban
and population dense areas are.
Focusing on the regions where our MFIs operate, Table 6 presents quartile sum-
maries of estimated scope economies based on our regional definitions (see “Appen-
dix” for specific countries and regions), and Fig. 2 contains a 3-dimensional plot of
the joint density of scope economies and region. In general, our scope estimates are
statistically significant in each region. We observe from the table that the highest scope
economies are realized within Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and South East Asia (SEA),
and further note that in these regions, there are no MFIs with diseconomies of scope (at
least at the quartiles). MFIs in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA), Latin Amer-
ica (LA), and the Middle East and Central Africa (MENA) have scope economies
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Fig. 2 Joint density plots for scope economies based on region
Table 7 Summary of scope economies by main market served and lending method for each quartile
Main market served Lending method
Urban Rural Both Village Solidarity Individual
Q1 −0.0440 0.0089 −0.0169 −0.0007 0.0061 −0.0556
(0.0256) (0.0211) (0.0010) (0.2265) (0.0113) (0.0238)
Q2 0.0832 0.1586 0.0805 0.1915 0.1867 0.0411
(0.0002) (0.0388) (0.0653) (0.0433) (0.2089) (0.1525)
Q3 0.3165 0.4386 0.2772 0.5894 0.4635 0.2332
(0.2308) (0.1136) (0.1924) (0.3941) (0.3508) (0.0353)
Standard errors are given in parentheses below each estimate. Statistically significant estimates at the 5 %
level are highlighted in bold
of smaller magnitude and have some observations with diseconomies of scope. Fig-
ure 2 shows us that these regions also have different shaped distributions of scope
economies. The distribution plot for SEA is highly bell-shaped, while other regions
are more uniformly distributed. We point out that at the median and upper quartile,
every region has economies of scope from both savings and lending. Our results indi-
cate, however, the extent of cost savings for MFIs varies considerably across regions,
with the highest cost savings being in SSA and SEA.
Scope economies in MFIs targeting mainly urban markets are, at the median, 8 %,
in those serving predominantly rural markets are 16 %, and those without clear spe-
cialization are at 8 % but insignificant (Table 7). MFIs using both village banking
and solidarity lending exhibit the largest median economies of 19 %, but the scope
estimate for the solidarity group is not significant. Those providing individual loans
have the lowest median scope economies of 4 %. These results are consistent with
our urban/rural division of scope economies: most villages are located in rural areas,
both of which showing the highest median scope economies. Thus, within the group-
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 3 Boxplots for scope economies based on service area and loan method. a Scope economies by service
area. b Scope economies by loan method
lending methodologies, village banks are more likely to be cost effective in mobilizing
deposits. We believe this is because in village banking the MFI has a captured audience
with whom credit officers can relate to and understand.
We present visual evidence of these estimates in Fig. 3 where we plot boxplots
of our estimated scope economies over the area of service (panel (a)) and type of
loan (panel (b)), respectively. It is clear from the plots that the distributions of scope
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estimates over each of these different groups varies substantially; not only do these
distributions have different central tendencies and interquartile ranges, it is clear that
several of these distributions are asymmetric. The top panel in the figure shows that
the rural areas generally have a higher estimate of scope economies, as does the village
banking group in the bottom panel.
6.6 Quasi economies of scope
So far, our analysis has focused on the standard scope economies estimate based on
Eq. (1). As pointed out by Pulley and Braunstein (1992), this measure assumes that
each firm perfectly specializes, which may not be reflected empirically by the data.
As a robustness check of our primary scope estimates, we focus on the subsample
of firms in our dataset (178 observations) that jointly produce both savings and loans
and estimate quasi economies of scope defined in Eq. (2).12 We follow our earlier
econometric strategy and deploy the generalized local polynomial estimator for the
smooth coefficient cost function, with bandwidths selected by smoothing over quasi
scope. We assume the degree of specialization of each firm is (1 − ) = 0.85.
Our restricted sample of microfinance institutions of 178 observations renders semi-
parametric estimation with the full set of environmental variables infeasible because
of dimensionality issues relative to the small sample size. We therefore focus on the
restricted set of environmental controls, namely the cost of labor and financial cap-
ital inputs, year and region. Before reporting summaries of our estimates of quasi
economies of scope, we report that our bandwidths on each of our nonparametric
variables lie below their respective upper bounds, indicating that each variable is both
relevant and a nonlinear predictor of heterogeneity in the cost coefficient functions.
Further, our generalized local polynomial optimization results indicate that the optimal
order of local polynomial for both continuously distributed nonparametric environ-
mental variables is of order 3. As in our scope economies estimates, we find evidence
that the standard local constant or local linear estimators are not of optimal polynomial
order for constructing our estimate of quasi-scope economies.
Table 8 reports quartile summaries of the quasi economies of scope estimates. We
see that our estimates of quasi economies of scope are slightly larger in magnitude
than our estimates of scope economies reported previously, with a median effect of
approximately 0.12. It is apparent, however, that the upper quartile of quasi-scope is
substantially higher than for scope. This suggests that the distribution of quasi-scope
economies is left skewed. Notice that while we find some evidence of diseconomies
of scope for a subset of observations, none of these diseconomies estimates are statis-
tically significant at any of the reported quartiles of diseconomies of scope.
Figure 4 shows the joint density plot between regions and quasi economies of
scope. We see that the distribution of quasi economies of scope is indeed left skewed,
as suggested by the quartiles reported in Table 8. Notice that this skewed shaped dis-
12 As a comparison, we consider our standard scope measure for only this subset of 178 countries and find
that, while there is a wider interquartile range of our estimates, the qualitative conclusion from our main
results is unchanged.
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Table 8 Quasi-scope economy measures summarized at the quartiles
Scope Diseconomies Economies
Q1 −0.1217 −0.5429 0.2284
(0.0053) (0.4510) (0.2509)
Q2 0.1167 −0.1955 0.7877
(0.1465) (0.1582) (0.3986)
Q3 0.9694 −0.0740 1.4835
(0.2704) (0.1450) (0.3133)
Standard errors for each estimate are given below in parentheses. Statistically significant scope estimates
at the 5 % level are highlighted in bold
Fig. 4 Joint density plots for quasi-scope economies based on region
tribution of quasi-scope estimates is substantially different from the distribution of
scope estimates reported previously for our standard scope economies measure.
While we do find some differences between our estimates of quasi economies of
scope and the standard economies of scope reported as our primary results, the qual-
itative conclusion across both scope measures is the same. At the median, we find
evidence that specialization in both savings and loans lead to reductions in costs of
about 10 %.
6.7 Economies of scale
We now turn to our estimates of economies of scale. Our reported estimates use the
bandwidths selected by smoothing over scope. We also considered a complete set of
results (scope and scale) estimated using generalized local polynomial bandwidths
selected by smoothing over scale, but did not find much qualitative difference in any
of our estimates compared to our results using the scope bandwidths. Table 9 contains
a summary of economies of scale measured at each quartile, with observation-specific
standard errors given below, for both cost models with and without full set of envi-
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Table 9 Scale economy measures summarized at the quartiles
Overall scale Diseconomies Economies
Controls No controls Controls No controls Controls No controls
Q1 0.5164 0.7666 0.3373 0.4654 1.2747 1.1923
(0.0601) (0.2317) (0.1980) (0.3022) (0.1610) (0.3353)
Q2 0.8940 1.0585 0.5584 0.7319 1.7627 1.4886
(0.0172) (1.0355) (0.0660) (0.5207) (0.1084) (0.2594)
Q3 1.5928 1.5684 0.7690 0.8660 2.8881 2.2047
(0.1308) (0.1523) (0.0159) (0.1969) (0.0090) (2.9465)
Standard errors for each estimate are given below in parentheses. Statistically significant scale estimates at
the 5 % level are highlighted in bold
ronmental controls. Recall that, in contrast to scope economies, diseconomies and
economies of scale are defined by whether the scale estimates are less than or greater
than unity, respectively.
We see that the median estimate of scale economies is 0.89 in the model with
full controls, indicating that the median observation in our sample experiences disec-
onomies of scale. We find the median scale estimate in the model without full controls
is 1.06, but is statistically insignificant. The interquartile range of scale economies for
both models spans both diseconomies and economies of scale. Focusing exclusively
on diseconomies and economies of scale, it is worth noting that we do not find large
differences in interquartile range across the controls and no controls specifications.
We do find more statistical significance in the model with full set of controls.
To understand the relationship between both scope and scale economies, Fig. 5 plots
the joint distribution of scale and scope economies for the full controls model (the same
plot for the no controls model looks virtually identical). It is clear from the figure that
nearly all of the scale estimates are positive, but that the mode is just below unity, sug-
gesting that a majority of the institutions in our sample experience diseconomies of
scale. It is also clear, as was shown in previous plots, that the majority of our observa-
tions have economies from scope (i.e., scope is greater than zero). Combined, this puts
the mode of this joint distribution just below unity on the scale axis, and just above zero
on the scope axis. In other words, the majority of the institutions in our sample exhibit
economies of scope, but diseconomies of scale. It is worth recognizing that there is a
large part of the joint density that exhibits economies of scope, and either increasing
or constant returns to scale (scale equals unity). It is also interesting to note that nearly
every observation with diseconomies of scope also shows diseconomies of scale.
While it may be unexpected that we find a large number of microfinance institutions
that have diseconomies of scope, suggesting that they are too large, this result should be
taken in the broader context of our analysis that suggests accounting for both deposits
and loans. Other studies which pay attention to purely the loan side of microfinance
can be criticized for ignoring this aspect.13 From Table 9 we see that nearly all firms
13 It is also worth noting that most of these studies measure output by the number of active borrowers (or
clients), while we use the volume of loans and deposits.
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Fig. 5 Joint density of scale and scope economies
with estimated economies of scope have increasing returns to scale, suggesting they
should continue (or begin) to offer deposits and increasing their operations. With the
operating environment controlled for, these estimates of economies of scale are statis-
tically significant. It is also interesting that those firms with estimated diseconomies of
scope have estimated decreasing scale economies, suggesting scaling back operations.
7 Conclusions
Economies of scope of lending and mobilizing deposits in banking are justified theoret-
ically (Diamond 1984), and policy makers recommend MFIs offer savings alongside
credit. However, in microfinance, the existence and magnitude of scope economies of
providing both loans and savings products has not been sufficiently investigated. We
use a semiparametric smooth coefficient model to estimate these economies using a
dataset put together from rated MFIs with 777 annual observations from MFIs across
the world. This semiparametric model affords the researcher sufficient flexibility in
incorporating zero-valued input prices and outputs into the cost function without resort-
ing to ad hoc data replacement techniques. This is important because many MFIs offer
only loans, and there is a need to know how transition to loans and savings could affect
MFIs.
Our interest in scope economies provides two important challenges for implement-
ing our semiparametric model. First, since scope economies are not observed, it is not
clear that the bandwidths chosen to be optimal for cost function estimation are also
optimal for scope estimation. Second, it is not a priori clear which degree of polyno-
mial is most efficient when implementing a semiparametric local polynomial estimator
to estimate our semiparametric model of economies of scope. We address these issues
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simultaneously by combining two novel econometric approaches: a generalized local
polynomial estimator that allows both the bandwidth and degree of polynomial to be
selected via data-driven cross-validation, and a cross-validation method that allows
for bandwidth selection over an unobserved measurement. We point out that (i) neither
of these methods have been used empirically; (ii) these methods have never been used
simultaneously; and (iii) these methods have never been considered in a semiparamet-
ric regression context.
We estimate two models of scope economies, one where only variables typ-
ically used in a cost function approach are included (total cost, output values,
and relative input prices) and a model where in addition to these variables we
include population density, a measure of financial sector development, type of mar-
ket served (urban, rural or both), and the predominant loan methodology (village
banking, solidarity groups and individual loans), as well as controls for time and
region. We find that scope economies are substantial across both settings and,
for either model, that most of the MFIs in our dataset have (or would) experi-
ence reductions in cost by offering both savings and loan services. We find that
our estimates of scope economies are generally more significant when we include
the full set of environmental variables, and that while most of our observations
exhibit economies of scope, the modal observation also exhibits diseconomies of
scale.
Overall, our finding of scope economies is intuitive and relevant. In tumultuous
financial markets, the finding that MFIs mobilizing local savings may not only pro-
vide much needed services for the poor but may also have cost advantages is impor-
tant. This suggests that agencies providing funding to MFIs could encourage both
microsavings and microloan services be offered. This requires increased attention on
creating a regulatory environment allowing MFIs to accept deposits, or strengthening
the MFI and maybe even donor support for them to become licensed deposit mobi-
lizing institutions. However, since around 25 % of MFIs experience diseconomies of
scope, largely stemming from environmental factors, the implication for policy mak-
ers is that general recommendations should be avoided. More research is needed to
understand microfinance regulations, the costs and benefits involved and what type of
regulation is actually needed for the mobilization of microsavings. For example, in
the environments where MFIs operate, could there be other governance mechanisms
that would protect the depositors as well as a public regulator? Future work on scope
economies in microfinance should attempt to obtain a more comprehensive data set
for MFIs and determine if other environmental variables are relevant in MFIs’ cost
structures.
Appendix
Distribution of MFIs by country is presented in Table 10. Comparison with other pub-
licly available data shows that these data have more observations from Latin America,
perhaps because they needed external funds.
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Table 10 Distribution of MFIs by region and country
Country # Obs. % Obs. Country # Obs. % Obs.
Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA)
Albania 10 1.29 Kazakhstan 9 1.16
Armenia 4 0.51 Kyrgyzstan 8 1.03
Azerbaijan 16 2.06 Moldova 8 1.03
Bosnia and Herzegovina 39 5.02 Romania 3 0.39
Bulgaria 4 0.51 Russia 30 3.86
Georgia 13 1.67 Tajikistan 11 1.42
Latin America (LA)
Argentina 3 0.39 Guatemala 16 2.06
Bolivia 53 6.82 Haiti 3 0.39
Brazil 36 4.63 Honduras 22 2.83
Chile 3 0.39 Mexico 55 7.08
Colombia 22 2.83 Nicaragua 28 3.60
Dominican Republic 14 1.80 Paraguay 4 0.51
Ecuador 51 6.56 Peru 98 12.61
El Salvador 11 1.42
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)
Benin 11 1.42 Mozambique 3 0.39
Burkina Faso 5 0.64 Senegal 8 1.03
Cameroon 9 1.16 South Africa 3 0.39
Ghana 5 0.64 Tanzania 3 0.39
Kenya 13 1.67 Togo 1 0.13
Madagascar 3 0.39 Uganda 12 1.54
Mali 3 0.39 Zambia 3 0.39
Southeast Asia (SEA)
Bangladesh 1 0.13 Indonesia 1 0.13
Cambodia 11 1.42 Mongolia 5 0.64
India 29 3.73 Philippines 10 1.29
Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
Chad 2 0.26 Jordan 9 1.16
Egypt 14 1.80 Morocco 12 1.54
Ethiopia 24 3.09 Tunisia 3 0.39
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